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The wide presence of the right to work in national and international legal texts contrasts with a lack 
of agreement about the concrete content of this right. According to the hegemonic interpretation, it 
consists of two elements: (a) extension of wage labour and (b) significant improvement of working 
conditions. However, if we study the history of right to work claims, especially from the French 
Revolution to 1848, we can notice that the meaning of this right was rather wider in the past. 
Rescuing the historical significance of the right to work may help to face the problem of the future of 
work. In particular, and unlike what might seem at first sight, the claim that everyone should have his 
or her right to work guaranteed can be a way of articulating and concretizing issues such as 
workplace democracy, the organization of domestic work or the transition to a sustainable society. 
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In the vineyard of the future, there will be work for all – wholesome, dignified, soul-
building work. 
J. Elliot Ross, The right to work (1917). 
 
1. The right to work today 
The right to work is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): 
 
Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable 





There are two possible interpretations here (Collins, 2015: 20–21). The first is to 
consider that Article 23(1) recognizes four distinct rights: the right to work, the right to 
free choice of employment, the right to just and favourable conditions of work and the 
right to protection against unemployment. The second is that we are faced with a single 
right, which basically consists in the extension of wage labour but includes three other 
dimensions: (a) free choice of employment, (b) decent or non-exploitative work assured 
by labour rights and (c) protection in case of unemployment. 
Although the first interpretation is possible on a literal level, the second seems more 
coherent from a theoretical point of view. We would hardly say that a state is guarantee- 
ing the right to work if jobs are created through forced labour, the elimination of labour 
rights or the removal of benefits for those (momentarily or permanently) outside labour 
markets. This leads us to believe that freedom to choose a job, decent work and unem- 
ployment benefits are part of the very idea of the right to work. 
Despite not having legal force in itself, the UDHR has served as a reference for many 
treaties of international law, as well as for the constitutional texts of different countries 
around the world. Among the former, the right to work is recognized in Article 1 of the 
European Social Charter or in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.2 On the other hand, it is established, among others, in the 
constitutions of Italy, Japan, India, Norway, France, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, Mexico, 
China, Brazil, Belgium and Argentina. 
This wide presence of the right to work in national and international legal texts 
contrasts with the insufficiency of institutional mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing it.  
In addition, the level of discrepancies on the specific content of the right is higher than in 
other cases. In the United Kingdom, the right to work usually means only permission to 
work. It is just the right to sign an employment contract. In the United States, it is the 
right not to join a trade union. 
However, according to the internationally prevailing meaning, the right to work 
consists, as mentioned, in the extension of wage labour, that is to say, in the reduction 
of involuntary unemployment through state action, including (a) free choice of  
employment, (b) decent work assured by labour rights and (c) protection against 
unemployment. As the right to freely choice a profession and unemployment benefits 
seem necessary conditions for any work in accordance with human dignity, they can be 
seen as just other labour rights. They have to do with access to work and absence of 
work, not with its development, but they do not appear to be substantially different 
from other worker’s rights. So, for the sake of simplicity, we can conclude that the right 
to work consists of two elements: (a) extension of wage labour and (b) decent or non- 
exploitative work. 
We should give the same importance to this second characteristic as to the first. As 
Virginia Mantouvalou points out, ‘for the right to work to make a positive contribution to 
a list of human rights, it must be conceived as the right to non-exploitative work’ 
(Mantouvalou, 2015: 39). I believe that studying the history of right to work claims, 
especially from the French Revolution to 1848, can contribute to opening the discussion 
about the best way to understand such non-exploitative work. Should we just enunciate a 
series of conditions of access, development and remuneration of wage labour (of 




In my opinion, the question about the meaning of non-exploitative work is inseparable 
from the question about the best way to organize work socially. In other words, when we 
think about the conditions that work would have to fulfil so as not to be alienating work 
but liberating work, we should not merely state a series of requirements that affect the 
‘quality’ of wage labour (such as working time, salary, resting periods, safety and health 
conditions, etc.), but we should also question what kind of relationship exists between 
those who work and those who own or control the main means of production that exist in 
our societies. From this, it follows that if we really want to take the second characteristic 
of the right to work (the need for non-exploitative work) seriously, we should discuss the 
very idea of wage labour. 
To express it in controversial terms, my point is that if the right to work must be the 
right to non-exploitative work, as Mantouvalou says, then perhaps it cannot simply be 
the right to wage labour. As we will see, this thesis, which goes against the contemporary 
meaning of the right to work, is precisely the way in which many of its supporters 
understood this right in the nineteenth century. 
But my argument may give rise to a false impression, which it is better to clarify 
before moving on.3 Every minimally complex society needs money as a mechanism to 
give and receive social advantages. Insofar as this is the case, it seems reasonable that 
money is the way to reward work. I do not mean to call this into question. I do not believe 
paying people for their work is intrinsically exploitative, as others have argued (Gom- 
berg, 2018: 527–528). 
When I use the expression ‘wage labour’, I am not referring to the fact that work is 
rewarded with money, but to the existence of labour markets in which those who are not 
in possession of the means of production sell their labour power to those who own these 
means, the former receiving a wage in exchange for their labour and the latter receiving 
profits for the capital invested. Wage labour is not just about people being paid for their 
work. Wage labour means that work itself becomes a commodity like any other. The 
direct consequence of widespread wage labour is that workers are subjected, in an 
activity on which their subsistence depends, to the logic of the markets.4 
Paid work does not equate to wage labour, just as money does not equate to capital. 
What democratic and socialist thinkers of different times have argued is that it is not 
possible to have a just society with capital and wage labour. But this does not mean, as 
we will see, that it is not possible to have a just society with money and paid work. 
 
2. The history of right to work claims 
Turgot already appeals to the right to work in his 1776 critique of guilds, but he under- 
stands it simply as a synonym for freedom to work (1776: 5). Charles Fourier is the first 
to use the expression to refer to a duty that society has towards individuals. In his Theory 
of the Four Movements (1808), which can be considered the first work of socialist theory, 
he mentions the right to work, although he does not develop the idea (1808: 193 and 371– 
372). A few years later, in his Treatise on Domestic-Agricultural Association (1822), he 
conceives this right as the substitute, in the societarian state, for the natural rights to 
hunting, fishing, gathering food and herding animals (1822: 126 and 137). From that 




or ‘organization of work’ – circulating in the French socialist literature of the first half of 
the nineteenth century. 
The 1848 Revolution in France makes the ‘right to work’ a well-known motto. When 
the uprising starts in February, the slogan is still very connected to the Fourierist school, 
but this changes as the months go by. In June, the right to work is included in the first 
draft of the constitutional text. Considerant, Fourier’s main disciple, re-edits in July a 
pamphlet he had already published in 1839 on the rights to property and work. Discus- 
sions on the right to work follow one another. In September, a heated debate about its 
inclusion or not in the future Constitution takes place in the National Assembly. I will 
focus on the way the socialist Louis Blanc understands the right to work in the context of 
this debate. Blanc puts it in relation to the socialist theories he has developed in previous 
years, giving a new meaning to the expression coined by the Fourierists. 
Before I dwell on the discussions on the right to work in 1848, I will devote a section 
to examining its historical roots. I will limit myself to explaining the similarities between 
Blanc’s ‘right to work’ and Robespierre’s ‘right to existence’.5 I think explaining the 
ideas of these two authors, who in addition to being theorists actively participated in 
politics, can provide a relatively clear idea of the genesis and evolution of the right to 
work between 1789 and 1848.6 
This way of proceeding has the disadvantage of leaving two relevant issues in the 
shade. On the one hand, interesting connections could undoubtedly be established 
between the history of the right to work in France and the genesis of very similar ideas 
in other countries.7 On the other hand, as the history of the right to work does not end in 
1848, it would be relevant to explain its further developments from the year of its 
popularization to the present day.8 However, I think exposing the ideas of Robespierre 
and Blanc is sufficient to my purpose, which is to confront contemporary right to work, 
as it is broadly recognized internationally after World War II, and the more radical sense 
it had in the nineteenth century. 
 
 
2.1. The right to existence 
Although the right to existence is a very old idea (Tierney, 2001: 69–77), I will focus 
only on the way it arises during the French Revolution. Robespierre states: 
 
What is the first purpose of society? It is to maintain the imprescriptible rights of man. What 
is the first of these rights? The right to exist. The first social law is therefore the one that 
guarantees all members of society the means of existence; all the others are subordinated to 
this one; property has not been instituted or guaranteed for anything other than to cement it; 
it is first and foremost in order to live that we have properties. It is not true that property can 
ever be in opposition to the subsistence of men (Robespierre, 1958a: 112). 
 
The proclamation that society has the obligation to ensure the means of existence for 
all its members is not conceived by Robespierre as a matter of charity towards the needy 
but as a duty of justice. That is to say, if one accepts (a) the universal character of the 
rights proclaimed in 1789 and (b) the republican idea that the enjoyment of a certain 




any law that prevents a part of the population from subsisting in a dignified manner is 
contrary to the rights of man. In particular, it is illegitimate every law – as the one that 
established unlimited freedom in the grain trade – that places property rights before the 
right to existence. 
In addition to this limitation of the property of the rich, Robespierre thinks that society 
has the obligation to actively guarantee the aforementioned right to existence. In his 
project of Declaration of Rights, which was not finally taken into account: 
 
X. Society is obliged to provide for the subsistence of all its members, either by providing 
them with work or by ensuring the means of existence for those who are unable to work. 
XI. The indispensable aids to the one who lacks what is necessary are a debt of the one who 
possesses what is superfluous: it is the responsibility of the law to determine the way in 
which this debt must be paid off (Robespierre, 1958b: 465–66). 
 
In sum, the right to existence must be guaranteed to the entire population (a) through 
the provision of work (or social assistance for those unable to work) and (b) through a 
series of laws designed to limit the property and the superfluous wealth of the rich. 
This proposal is different from the way in which the same subject is treated in the 
Constitution of 1791, despite the similarities of surface: 
 
A general establishment for public relief shall be created and organized to bring up aban- 
doned children, relieve the crippled poor, and provide work for the able-bodied poor who 
have been unable to procure it for themselves.9 
 
Here a universal right to existence is not recognized. Consequently, the provision of 
work is not understood as a means of ensuring a right of all citizens, but as a help focused 
on the poor. The objective is not to eliminate misery, but only to prevent it from being 
excessive, through a public charity system, in the style of the English Poor Laws. 
Robespierre’s conception is quite different even from the Constitution of 1793: 
 
Public relief is a sacred debt. Society owes subsistence to unfortunate citizens, either by 
providing them with work or by ensuring the means of existence for those unable to work.10 
 
Although public assistance is understood here as a debt owed by society to unfortu- 
nate citizens, and not as charity, it is still focused only on part of the population. 
Therefore, the provision of work is, again, a help addressed to the poorest, not a universal 
right. In any case, regardless of how the 1793 constitutional text is interpreted in relation 
to public assistance, as more or less distinct from the 1791 text, what is most important is 
to consider the way in which it was put into practice. It is often said that the 1793 
Constitution had little practical influence. But this is not entirely true. In a short and 
very turbulent period, the montagnards undertook a radical reading of the 1793 Consti- 
tution and made efforts to ensure its enforcement. 
A particularly interesting case is that of the Paris Commune, headed by Mayor Pache. 




the Commune adopts a petition to the National Convention in which a comprehensive 
social program is specified. The General Council’s purpose is: 
 
not to relieve the miserable, but to eradicate misery by providing young people with a 
resource for old age; and for those who only have their arms, courage, health and the means 
to use them in such a way that they can one day become owners (quoted in Larne, 2017: 
236). 
 
Similarly, Robespierre considers it necessary to put limits on the property of the rich 
but does not defend the abolition of private property. His ideal is the extension of 
property to all, in order to guarantee the right to existence. Rather than opposing prop- 
erty, Robespierre affirms that true property is the one that enables the person who owns it 
to lead a dignified life: 
 
Yes, the rough clothing that covers me, the humble retreat where I acquire the right to retire 
and to live in peace; the modest wage with which I nourish my wife, my children; all this, I 
admit, are not lands, chateaux, or cohorts; all this is perhaps called nothing from the point of 
view of luxury and opulence, but it is something for humanity; it is a sacred property, as 
sacred, no doubt, as the brilliant domains of the rich (Robespierre, 1952: 164). 
 
For Robespierre, property is, above all, the means to guarantee the right to existence 
of all citizens. It consists in the possession of the consumer goods and working tools that 
are essential to lead a dignified life. Moreover, just as for John Locke, property is not 
limited to the possession of a set of material goods but includes everything that is 
necessary for the development of the person: 
 
My liberty, my life, the right to obtain security or revenge for myself and for those who are 
dear to me, the right to reject oppression, the right to freely exercise all the faculties of my 
spirit and my heart (Robespierre, 1952: 164). 
 
The montagnards, in the short period between June 1793 and July 1794, made use of 
the following instruments in order to guarantee everyone this kind of ‘property’: (a) the 
extension of small private property founded on personal work, (b) the development of the 
‘public sphere’, with a view to the creation of educational and social security systems, (c) 
the guarantee of the rights of use of the common goods and (d) the control of the prices of 
essential goods (Bosc, 2019). Only when this ‘property’ is guaranteed, only when the 
right to existence is secured, do the accumulation of wealth and the development of free 
trade amount to legitimate activities: 
 
The food necessary for man is as sacred as life itself. Everything that is indispensable to 
preserve it is a common property of the whole society. Only the surplus can be an individual 
property, and can be abandoned to the merchants’ industry (Robespierre, 1958a: 112). 
 
This political and economic plan interests us because it anticipates many of the issues 




2.2. The right to work 
The ‘right to work’ of 1848 is a precision or specification of the right to existence: it 
consists in the duty of society (through the state) to provide work to the entire population, 
so that everyone has his or her basic needs covered. The main theorist of the right to work 
is Louis Blanc. In Organization of work (1839), he proposes that political reform should 
serve as a means to a deep social reform. The former consists in the democratization of 
public institutions, through the recognition of universal suffrage and the conversion of 
the state into ‘the banker of the poor’. The latter concerns the establishment of ‘social 
workshops’, acting as both production and consumption cooperatives and progressively 
moving towards their self-financing. 
In 1848, however, these ‘social workshops’ crystallized into something very different: 
the ‘national workshops’. These were organizations in which, under a military discipline 
and in exchange for low wages, the state employed the poor. Despite having little to do 
with the cooperatives of workers theorized by Blanc, the national workshops became, 
both for their supporters and their opponents, a kind of emblem of the ‘social republic’ 
that had been set in motion or, rather, that could be realized in the near future if the 
reforms would carry on. The workshops were finally suppressed, generating a popular 
uprising in June 1848 that was harshly repressed. 
It is in this context that the National Assembly discussed the 1848 Constitution. One 
of the most heated parliamentary debates, which also had a significant impact on public 
opinion, concerned the right to work. Finally, it was not included in the Constitution, nor 
were the rights to education or assistance. The debate is complex, and it would be 
difficult to give an accurate idea of it in a few words. I will just point out the two central 
issues: (a) the differences between the right to work and the right to assistance and (b) the 
contradictions between the right to work and the right to property. Let us see, briefly, the 
way in which supporters and opponents of the right to work grappled with these two 
problems. 
Some of the opponents of the right to work tended to assimilate it to the right to 
assistance, in order to reject both rights (Garnier, Faucher). Other opponents tended to 
separate them, rejecting the right to work but accepting the right to assistance, under- 
stood as public charity (Tocqueville, Thiers). Among the supporters of the right to work, 
the general tendency was to stress the relationships between the right to work and the 
right to assistance, conceived no longer as public charity, but as a complement to the 
right to work, as a duty that society owes to those who, due to age or illness, are unable to 
work. In this sense, Louis Blanc stated that it makes no sense to oppose the right to work 
but to accept the right to assistance, as Thiers claimed. 
 
On what can the right to assistance be based? Obviously on the principle that every man, at 
birth, has received from God the right to live. But this is precisely the principle that under- 
lies the right to work. If man has the right to life, he must have the right to the means of 
preserving it. What is this means? Work. Admitting the right to assistance and denying the 
right to work means recognizing the right of man to live unproductively, when the right to 
live productively is not recognized; it means consecrating its existence as a burden, while 




Regarding the conflict between the right to work and the right to property, the 
opposite holds true. Here it is the opponents of the right to work who are united: 
according to them, this right represents an obvious threat to property. On the other hand, 
supporters of the right to work agree that legitimate property is work-based, and some- 
times they express this by saying that the right to work is an indispensable condition for 
securing the right to property for all. However, they differ in their understanding of the 
relationship between the two rights. Sometimes, the aim is to combine the right to work 
with the maintenance (or with the slow and progressive transformation) of property 
rights of the time: such is the conception of the moderate republicans Lamartine and 
Crémieux, and also that of the more reformists Mathieu de la Drôme, Ledru-Rollin and 
Considerant. In other cases, it is argued that the guarantee of the right to work is only 
possible through a major transformation in the way production is organized and, there- 
fore, through the modification of the right to property. According to Proudhon: 
 
No, there is no right to work except through the transformation of property, just as there is 
no Republic worthy of the name other than the democratic and social Republic (see Garnier, 
1848: 390). 
 
Blanc, although in a more conciliatory tone than Proudhon, vindicates in the end the 
same thing. So does the socialist François Vidal, in his book, To live by working!: 
 
The right to work, whether known or ignored, necessarily implies the organization of 
work, and the organization of work implies the economic transformation of society (Vidal, 
1848: 19). 
 
These differences between the supporters of the right to work in relation to the friction 
between the right to work and the right to property are due to the fact that, in reality, not 
everyone is thinking about the same thing when speaking of the ‘right to work’. Those 
who seek to make both rights compatible, such as Considerant (1848: 17 and 24–25), 
understand the right to work as the extension of wage labour to everyone. Those who 
consider them incompatible, such as Blanc, understand the right to work as the over- 
coming of the relationship between the owner and the wage labourer, in favour of free 
and associated work. 
For Blanc, the right to work is the right to equal participation in productive activities. 
It is not the right to be integrated into the capitalist form of organizing work, but the right 
to a different kind of work. Society must secure the basic needs of each of its members 
(the right to existence, Robespierre would say), so as to encourage the development of 
each member’s capacities at the same time. Individuals should be equal, in the sense that 
everyone should have his or her basic needs met. In addition, they should be truly free, 
that is to say, they should have the necessary means to exercise their faculties. This can 
be reached, according to Blanc, through the rights to education and work: 
 
Since we admit that men, in order to be truly free, need to enjoy the power to exercise and 




without which the human spirit cannot develop, and the instruments of work without which 
human activity cannot be exercised (Blanc, 1847: 19). 
 
According to Blanc, these human faculties to be developed are not the same in all 
individuals. That is why, in his opinion, the aim of socialism should not consist in the 
state offering citizens jobs over which they have no decision-making power. The state 
should promote that the means of production are in the hands of the workers themselves, 
so that they can associate and undertake the initiatives they most desire and for which 
they are most qualified: 
 
this principle being accepted, that all men have an equal right to the full development of 
their unequal faculties, the instruments of work should belong to all like the air and the sun 
(Blanc, 1849a: 27). 
 
Socialism must deal with both distribution and production. The fact that individuals 
have unequal abilities and needs makes levelling egalitarianism undesirable in both 
spheres. The distributive criterion should be to give each one according to his or her 
needs. The guiding principle in the development of productive activities should be to 
place demands on each one according to his or her faculties. The well-known socialist 
slogan ‘from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs’, popularized 
by Marx, has great importance in Blanc’s theory: 
 
the true principle of fraternity, when work would mark the definitive progress of human 
societies, is not the absolute equality of salaries, but the distribution of work according to 
faculties, and the distribution of fruits according to needs (Blanc, 1849a: 7). 
the distribution of work and the distribution of its fruits would be based on .. . the consti- 
tutive principle of the family: from each according to his faculties and to each according to 
his needs (Blanc, 1849a: 28). 
 
On the one hand, the kind of distribution defended by Blanc opposes both vulgar 
egalitarianism and the meritocratic conception of the Saint-Simonians. According to the 
latter, the more (and better) one works, the more one should receive: ‘to each according 
to his capacity, to each capacity according to its works’.11 
On the other hand, Blanc’s conception of production consists in each person con- 
tributing freely, without hierarchical coercion and according to his or her abilities. The 
duty to work does not disappear, but it does not mean anymore that the ruling classes can 
demand certain levels of performance from individuals. It is the moral duty to contribute 
according to one’s own abilities in a context of free and associated work. 
In sum: both the organization of work and the distribution of its fruits must take into 
account unequal human capabilities and needs. Society, therefore, owes more to those 
most in need. The most capable individuals in each concrete field of production, for their 
part, owe more to society: ‘The one who needs to receive more is due more; and the one 
who can give more, more must give’ (Blanc, 1849a: 8). 
In relation to this, it can be said that Blanc understands work as both a need and a 




every society needs to organize human labour in one way or another. Work is, primarily, 
the unavoidable means by which different individuals belonging to a given society meet 
their needs. If there are some individuals who do not work and have their needs met, it is 
because there are others who work for them. The capitalist way of organizing work 
supposes that the poorest part of the population is responsible for carrying out the 
socially necessary work, for the benefit of the rich. 
On the other hand, from the point of view of the individual, work is more a capacity 
than a need. It is perfectly possible to live without working. Individual labour power is a 
capacity that all humans have, which can develop in one sense or another, depending on 
external incentives, and which differs between individuals, in the sense that some are 
better at one type of work and others are better at another. The capitalist way of organiz- 
ing work is not suited to these unequal human faculties, due to the problems arising from 
both structural unemployment and the commodification and division of labour.12 
Because modern society does not manage work as a social necessity or as an indi- 
vidual capacity in a just and humane way, it is necessary to reorganize social work as a 
whole. The importance Blanc gives to this new organization of work is due to the idea 
that only by transforming the sphere in which the individual is an active being is it 
possible to become truly emancipated. For him, the right to work is, above all else, the 
right to equal participation in the workplace, more so than a right to state benefits. 
Blanc’s conception of the right to property is in line with all the above: 
 
Precisely because property is a right, it should not be made a privilege; precisely because the 
right to property is inherent to human nature, all who belong to human nature are called to 
enjoy the advantages of the right to property. It is not a question of denying it, to the 
detriment of some; it must be confirmed for the benefit of all (Blanc, 1849b: 18–19). 
 
Blanc does not seek to deny the right to property but wants to generalize it. He 
considers that any property that does not come from work is illegitimate and that any 
work that does not lead to property is oppressive. In this respect, his conception is very 
similar to Robespierre’s. Both theories are about limiting the oppressive property of a 
minority so that everyone can, through his or her work, become the owner of the means 
necessary to continue working in freedom and of the goods necessary to live with 
dignity. The difference between them is that Blanc considers that the only way to 
effectively generalize the right to property (in the society of his time) is to proclaim the 
right to work, that is, to organize a socio-economic regime based on association, on 
workers’ cooperative movement supported by the state. 
 
 
2.3. The right to work as an updated version of the right to existence 
The right to work is nothing other than the reformulation, adapted to the new realities of 
the emerging industrial society, of the right to existence of the French Revolution. This 
does not mean that the right to work is simply the creation of jobs by the state, as a way of 
satisfying the basic needs to those who cannot find employment on their own. At least for 




order to achieve a truly just society. The right to work is democracy at work. It consists in 
the extension of equal freedom from the political to the social realm. 
When writing about the 1848 Revolution in France, Marx clearly sees the emanci- 
patory potential behind the right to work. At the same time, he does not believe that the 
best way to fulfil the claim contained therein is to formulate it as a ‘right’, nor to move 
towards its realization through state reform: 
 
The first draft of the constitution, made before the June days, still contained the droit au 
travail, the right to work, the first clumsy formula wherein the revolutionary demands of the 
proletariat  are  summarised.  It  was  transformed  into  the  droit  à  l’assistance, the  right  to 
public relief, and what modern state does not feed its paupers in some way or other? The 
right to work is, in the bourgeois sense, an absurdity, a miserable, pious wish. But behind the 
right to work stands the power over capital; behind the power over capital, the appropriation 
of the means of production, their subjection to the associated working class and, therefore, 
the abolition of wage labour, of capital and of their mutual relations (Marx, 2010: 77–78). 
 
Marx rejects the expression because of its imprecision, because of the duality of 
interpretations given to it in 1848, one of which turned the right to work into mere help 
to the poor. However, for Marx, as for Blanc, the real meaning of the right to work 
conflicts with the capitalist way of organizing production and, in particular, with the 
private ownership of the means of production. Only by abolishing this kind of property, 
and not through mere reforms on it, will it be possible to move towards a different 
organization of work. This radical meaning of the right to work, as a principle articulat- 
ing a social order that opposes the unlimited ownership of a minority, is common to 
Robespierre, Blanc and Marx, despite all the differences in both theory and political 
strategy between them. 
In short, the right to work, in 1848, is not so much the individual right to get a job, as 
we might think from our current viewpoint, but rather a way of guaranteeing the right to 
existence that puts the civilizing potential of human labour in the foreground. At that 
time, ensuring the right to work means, at least for some of its defenders, the transition 
from wage labour to free and associated work. It is the aim to replace the hierarchical 
relationship between capital and labour with democracy in the workplace. 
 
 
3. The future of work 
As we said at the beginning, the right to work is currently recognized in international 
human rights law and in the constitutions of many different countries. In this sense, it is 
not just a morally desirable idea theorized by academia, but a legal-political mechanism 
that states can and should use to transform society. The way in which these legal texts 
refer to the right to work is more similar to Considerant’s vision than to Blanc’s. That is, 
it has more to do with the extension to all of decent wage labour than with a new way of 
organizing work. However, as the history of this right reminds us, the contemporary way 
of understanding it is not the only possible one: it has not emerged out of the blue, but is 




In particular, I believe that the study of the history of right to work claims can help to open 
up the discussion about the best way to understand decent or non-exploitative work. Current 
approaches to this issue sometimes lose sight of the existing relations of production, focus- 
ing only on the conditions that work should meet to be meaningful, or at least in accordance 
with human dignity. Despite the great theoretical interest of these reflections, they have two 
limitations: they can lead to concealing both the social and political nature of work. 
On the one hand, it is not clear that the possibility of doing meaningful work is 
attainable for everyone in a complex society. Reflecting on the characteristics of the 
kind of work that enables individuals to flourish is important, but it is even more 
important to bear in mind the extent to which this ideal can be universalized. As Andrea 
Veltman states, it is not likely that meaningful work can be guaranteed in all kind of 
tasks. This is not a reason, as she says, against trying to transform social and political 
institutions in order to increase opportunities for meaningful work. But it is a call to 
theoretical and political realism. To the extent that there are some socially necessary jobs 
that can hardly become attractive, the discussion on meaningful work should always be 
accompanied by a reflection on how to organize this other kind of work. Veltman 
mentions some partial solutions that could make bad or routine work more bearable: 
making it rotary or shared, establishing better conditions for those who perform it (as 
high remuneration or time limitation) or moving towards its progressive elimination 
thanks to automation (Veltman, 2015). In my opinion, however, there is a solution that 
predates all of them, which is to extend the egalitarian principles that govern the political 
realm in our societies to the world of work, so that it is the workers themselves who 
decide how to deal with bad work. This brings us to the second point. 
Theories about meaningful work should not forget that work is, above all, a political 
problem. Inequalities of power in the workplace prevent the possibility of meaningful 
work for a large majority.14 It is not possible to have decent work for all when few people 
control its access, development and remuneration.15 Reflections on the ‘quality’ of work 
should take into account, even if only as a backdrop, the feature that essentially distin- 
guishes our economic system from others that have existed in the past: the widespread 
commodification of the labour power of the many and the concentration of the means of 
production in the few, which results in ‘free’ but exploitative labour relations. Free in the 
sense that they are not forced, but exploitative in the sense that there is no equal 
relationship between employers and employees.16 
The right to existence in 1789 and the right to work in 1848 were both about the 
decommodification of the labour power. The idea was to guarantee to every individual, 
as a right, a dignified existence and a liberating work. One thing that history can show us 
is the difficulty of guaranteeing this right so long as certain types of property are con- 
centrated in a few hands. Both Robespierre’s and Blanc’s theories took this into account. 
They both talked about limiting the unrestricted ownership of the rich. In both cases, the 
alternative was not the elimination of private property, but rather the universalization 
and democratic control of the means necessary to live and work. 
Is this political and economic plan still relevant? Can it be updated to meet contem- 
porary challenges? It may not be easy to undertake this task, but the growing injustice 
and precariousness in the world of work should encourage us to try. Focusing on the 




being of secondary importance (as socialism has done sometimes) a whole range of 
issues that also have to do with the social organization of work, such as the lack of 
democracy in the workplace, the unequal distribution of domestic work or the ecological 
impact of productive and distributive activities. It means, rather, that all these issues are 
better understood if they are not addressed in isolation but taking into account the social 
relations of production as a whole. 
In this sense, I think that the right to work, to be a truly emancipatory right, should 
help to achieve these three objectives concerning the present and the future of work: (a) 
the extension of democracy from the political to the economic sphere, (b) a fairer 
distribution of domestic work and (c) the transition to a sustainable society. These three 
issues have a great deal to do with the way employment is currently organized, but at the 
same time they transcend this domain and must be addressed from as broad a perspective 
as possible. The reflections on the past of the right to work that I have summarized in 
these pages, insofar as they go beyond the limits of wage labour, may be a good way to 
start thinking about these three major contemporary problems. 
Firstly, applying the language of rights to the world of work can help us to notice that 
the strict hierarchy of workplaces runs counter to the principles that in any democratic 
society govern the political sphere (Anderson, 2017). A number of contemporary authors 
have argued convincingly in favour of the idea that production runs best when the 
producers themselves democratically decide how to organize their work. Among the 
best known contributions are the books of David Schweickart on ‘economic democracy’ 
(1996), Seymour Melman on ‘workplace democracy’ (2001) and Richard Wolff on 
‘democracy at work’ (2012).17 
The right to work also concerns the domestic sphere. Although the word ‘work’ generally 
leads us to think of work done outside home, domestic work has always required (and still 
does) a significant share of the human labour power. This work, which takes place ‘behind 
Marx’s hidden abode’ (Fraser, 2014), is mostly done by women and more specifically by 
poor women. It is an effort that, if developed outside the market, is hardly taken into account 
or rewarded. The informality of domestic activities may make this recognition difficult, but 
there is no doubt that steps can be taken in that direction. The key is to stop understanding the 
right to work simply as the right to wage labour, and move towards understanding it as a right 
that includes aids concerning reproductive labour. What concrete measures would follow 
from this? One could be the improvement of maternity and paternity benefits, aimed at a 
fairer distribution of all the work involved in raising children. 
Finally, the right to work is also about the environment. It is true that the elimination 
of certain types of environmentally harmful work can lead to job losses, and in this sense 
the concern about the environment militates against the right to work. However, if we 
consider things from a wider perspective, we can notice that current economic and 
ecological problems are closely linked.18 The degradation of human labour relations 
and the degradation of nature are inseparably connected. The transition to a sustainable 
society, for its part, requires new ways of working and living. If work is seen as a right, 
rather than as a way of obtaining benefits for a few, nature ceases to be a resource to be 
exploited, and its conservation becomes the starting point of any kind of human work. 
Truly tackling any of these three problems would mean going beyond the limits currently 




as we saw when speaking of the right to work in 1848, visions of a future society have not 
always looked favourably upon a profound transformation of the world of work: 
 
Some radical theorists have seen a more just society as merely requiring the rationalization 
of present-day work relations, accompanied by increased leisure time and more equitable 
distribution. Others have focused on the need to transcend the entire system of alienated 
labor and make the development of creative work relations the central element of a new 
revolutionary society (Foster, 2017). 
 
This same dilemma remains fully valid today. Foster explains that: 
 
today most depictions of a future sustainable society take work and production as econom- 
ically and technologically determined, or as simply displaced by automation, and focus 
instead on maximizing leisure as society’s highest aim (Foster, 2017). 
 
In opposition to this view, Foster relies on Marx and William Morris to advocate a 
radical transformation of work. He considers that the essence of a future sustainable 
society must be located in the labour process. According to him, thinking the future of 
work is not a question of reducing it to a minimum. The aim is, rather, the reduction of 
pain within work to the lowest possible level. The objective is not the liberation from 
work, but to organize work in a liberating way. This does not mean giving up automation, 
but using it to reduce the heaviest tasks, rather than to job displacement. 
The French philosopher Dominique Méda proposes something similar. She explains 
that the scenarios in vogue today concerning the future of work propose either disman- 
tling labour law or adapting production to the so-called ‘technological revolution’. Both 
projects rest on the diagnosis that work can no longer occupy the central place it once 
had. They share a deterministic view of production, considering that the growth of 
precarious work is inevitable in a digital and globalized world. Opposing these two 
horizons, Méda proposes an ecological conversion of the economy, which she sees as 
an opportunity not only to achieve full employment but also to change the very nature of 
work. In fact, she explicitly links this transition to a sustainable society with the devel- 
opment of care work and democracy at work (Méda, 2016: 16–26). 
What I would add is that such emancipatory scenario can rely on the right to work. 
Insofar as this right has broad legal recognition, those who seek to transform the world of 
work may see it as an ally to legally substantiate their proposals and put them more easily 
into practice. In this article, I have dealt with a previous step, in my opinion no less 
important: the recovery of the transforming potential of the right to work. The brief 
history of its origin has tried to show that its true realization goes beyond the extension of 
wage labour and that although it is fully compatible with the existence of private prop- 




When we think about the present and the future of work, should we simply list a set of 




decent, or should we focus on the social relations that impede taking that dignity beyond 
certain limits? Why do we accept so naturally that in democratic societies, wherein the 
principle ‘one person, one vote’ prevails, we spend a large part of our lives in highly 
hierarchical workplaces? Is work only a burden to be minimized or can its transformation 
become the cornerstone of a new society? How can we move towards a new social 
organization of work that makes it possible to universalize non-exploitative work, work 
that does not squeeze the force of those who do it, but contributes to the free development 
of their personality? 
It may be difficult to reach shared answers, but it is worthwhile, at least, to seriously 
consider these kinds of questions when reflecting on the future of work. As I have tried to 
show in these pages, the history of right to work claims can help us to move along this 
path. More precisely, taking into account these claims, as one of the first ways in which 
the incipient labour and socialist movement of the nineteenth century opposed the 
modern way of organizing production, can contribute to giving new impetus to a right 
that has a wide legal recognition at present, but that often remains in the background or is 
underutilized. 
In short, the history of the right to work can help us to better understand the present 
situation of the world of work and to better face its future transformation from a far- 
reaching perspective. Proposals regarding the future of work should not become letters to 
Santa Claus, in which we each make requests according to our individual preferences, 
but neither should they be formulated from a narrow determinism based on current 
limitations. They should neither naively point to the land of Cockaigne, in which it is 
not necessary to make any kind of effort to live, nor make alarmist predictions auguring 
an inevitable increase of unemployment due to automation. The future of work is open 
and no one can control or predict its development, not even those who presently hold the 
greatest power over workplaces. 
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Notes 
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 23(1). 
2. For further information, see O’Cinneide (2015). 
3. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this lack of precision in an earlier version of 
the article. 
4. As Polanyi explains in The Great Transformation, markets exist since ancient times, but they 
play, until the expansion of the capitalist system, a relatively secondary role in societies’ 
economic life. In particular, trade is not generally applied to work, land or money. Their 
description as commodities, Polanyi adds, is entirely fictitious: although they are actually 
bought and sold on the markets, they have not been ‘produced’ for that purpose. See Polanyi 
(2001), chapter 6. 
5. On what Blanc’s socialism owes to the democratic republicanism of the French Revolution, 
see Loubère (1961). 
6. For the connections between the two French revolutions concerning the world of work, see 




7. On English Jacobinism during the period 1792–1796, and its persistence in the early 
nineteenth-century English labour movement, see Thompson (2002), chapters 5 and 16. In 
other countries, connexions between democratic republicanism and socialist ideas take place 
over a longer period of time. On the history of labour republicanism in the United States, from 
early agrarianism to the Knights of Labor, see Gourevitch (2015), chapters 3 and 4. I do not 
know the German case well enough to make relevant indications. I can just point out the 
peculiar union Fichte establishes between republican and socialist ideas in his political phi- 
losophy:  see  Fichte  (2012)  and  Léon  (1914).  On  Marx’s  republicanism,  as  well  as  on  the 
oblivion of the republican tradition in nineteenth-century German social democracy, see 
Domènech (2004), chapter 4; more recently, on the first topic, see Leipold (2017). 
8. A brief history of the right to work, from Fourier to its recognition in international human 
rights law, through the two French revolutions, twentieth-century communism, New Deal 
policies and the Swedish case, can be found in Harvey (1998, 1–46). 
9. Constitution  française  du  3  septembre  1791,  “Titre  Premier  :  Dispositions  fondamentales 
garanties par la Constitution.” 
10. Constitution française du 6 messidor an I, “Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 
1793,” art. 21. 
11. To understand the differences between supporters of the slogans ‘to each according to his needs’ 
and ‘to each according to his contribution’ in nineteenth-century socialism, see Menger (1899). 
12. The discussion on whether or not work is an indispensable condition for human fulfilment, 
although theoretically relevant, is not necessary to justify the right to work. Regardless of 
whether work is one of the basic needs of individuals, there is no doubt that, as Blanc reminds 
us, it is a social need and an individual faculty. The fact that this social need is unjustly 
distributed (bad work is performed by poor people), together with the fact that not everyone 
has the same opportunity to develop his or her individual faculties in the workplace, are 
sufficient reasons to support the right to work. 
13. On the loss of the social dimension of current human rights, see Moyn (2018). 
14. This lack of meaning can even affect well-paid and socially regarded jobs. On the mean- 
inglessness caused by the current form of organizing productive activities in our societies, see 
Graeber (2018). 
15. For the connections between meaningful work and workplace democracy, see Yeoman (2014). 
16. Exploitation does not mean here that workers are treated badly, but that they are embedded in 
competitive markets, where they are treated as commodities and, once they are hired, as 
human capital. In capitalist economies, human resources are exploited in the same way natural 
resources are exploited: they are both used to obtain benefits. This exploitation may not be 
morally harmful to many wage labourers, especially to those in the most qualified positions, 
but it is based on an inequality of power between employers and employees which runs 
counter to the democratic principles ruling the political sphere in any Western country. I    
am aware, however, that contemporary wage labour is not as exploitative as nineteenth- 
century wage slavery. Before the development of labour law at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the relationship between the employer and the employee in large factories was a form 
of modern servitude, as the latter depended almost completely on the will of the former. 
Nowadays, no labour contract can run counter to certain basic legal labour rights. These rights 
can be considered as a realization, albeit partial, of the nineteenth-century ideal of the right to 




17. A defence of workplace democracy from republican theory can be found in González-Ricoy 
(2014). 
18. This is clearly shown in the first report of the Green New Deal Group (2008). At present, 
Green New Deal proposals are being widely discussed within the US Democratic Party. 
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Société des É tudes Robespierristes, 158–174. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
Robespierre, Maximilien. 1958a. “Sur les subsistances (2 décembre 1792).” In Œuvres de Max- 
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